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THE CHANGING TOTEMS OF EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
GOVERNACE: LIBERALISATION, MARKET FORCES AND THE IMPORTANCE 








Since the late 1970s, the telecommunications sector in Europe has undergone nothing 
short of radical and wholesale transformation in terms of its technologies, goods, 
services, and market types. Through a complex evolutionary process the long-established 
twin ‘totemic’ characteristics of state ownership and public service around which the 
sector was built and functioned have been replaced by  those of liberalisation and 
efficient market functioning. The sector also underwent a process of internationalisation 
in terms of the outlook and strategies of its key commercial protagonists in each of 
Europe’s historically highly national-centric and foreclosed markets, as well as in the key 
area of the sector’s governance. An outstanding feature in the ensuing political-economic 
milieu of change has been the emergence and growth of the EU as a prominent policy 
actor in the telecommunications field. 
 
Drawing on the core theme of this volume – the role of the EU in regulation and the 
public interest in the communications industries – this chapter explores and evaluates the 
increasingly prominent role which the EU has played in the telecommunications sector in 
Europe over more than 25 years. Telecommunications provides a case of extensive and 
well-developed EU policy activities in the communications – it is arguably the most ‘EU-
ised’ of the culture industries examined in this volume. It asks and seeks to answers to 
two questions.  
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First, why has the EU assumed such significance in telecommunications? In brief, the 
chapter argues that this can be explained by two core reasons which underpin a rich and 
complex picture of policy activity: the opportunities, on the one hand, and threats, on the 
other, perceived by EU Member states from economic internationalisation couched 
within the globalisation policy discourse; and the active role played by European 
Commission as the key EU-level institutional actor in the telecommunications policy 
arena. Second, how has EU telecommunications policy evolved over the period in 
question? The chapter explains this evolution as a still-ongoing process of shifting policy 
equilibria between national and EU levels in which a plethora national and European 
level governmental and private actors have played roles in the precise nature of the 
equilibrium point reached at core policy junctures explored in the chapter. 
 
In undertaking its exploration and analysis in this way, the chapter illustrates how the role 
of public actors and public interest issues altered in telecommunications. The nation state, 
the historic key custodian and functionary in telecommunications, gradually – though not 
without controversy – ceded direct control of the ownership of the key parts of the sector 
which were in its hands to private interests and the market. It also transferred governance 
of an increasingly liberalised sector to independent regulatory authority at the national 
level and, very importantly – through agreeing a legislative package to harmonise and 
liberalise telecommunications markets – to the EU level. This has been delivered through 
an important developing regulatory relationship between the national and the EU 
institutional contexts which is explored in the chapter. The inexorable process of 
liberalisation through phased re-regulation inevitably impacted upon the definition and 
treatment of traditionally very strong public interest issues in telecommunications which 
have become shaped by and expressed through the discourse and practices of the market 
increasingly: public interest issues are now formulated and delivered in terms of 
consumer rights rather than the broader conceptualisation of public service.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides a very brief overview of 
the traditional structure of, and justification for, the telecommunications sector in Europe. 
The section following this explores the evolution of EU telecommunications policy from 
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the early legislative activity of the 1980s through to the agreement of a comprehensive 
liberalisation package by Member States in the early 1990s which entered into force in 
1998. The chapter’s third section explores the important period of  refinement of the 1998 
regulatory framework which the EU and its Member States undertook leading to 
agreement on  what came to be known as the Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework (ECRF), agreed in 2002. The penultimate section of the chapter explores the 
current ongoing review of the EU telecommunications policy framework, which is likely 
to lead to the next stage of policy equilibrium, making in the process some tentative 
predictions about its likely shape and significance. Finally, the chapter offers some 
conclusions on the importance of the EU in shaping regulation and public interest issues 
in telecommunications. 
 
REGULATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS – THE ‘TRADITIONAL’ POSITION 
 
Historically, telecommunications was a sector with which the EU had little or no 
engagement. This was due to the striking nation state centricity and nationally inward-
looking nature of the sector, ironic given the potential of communications technologies 
and services to allow the world to become a ‘smaller place’. In fact, the internationality 
of the sector in organisational terms was inherently intergovernmental in the shape of a 
minimal series of interface technical and commercial agreements detailing arrangements 
for the carriage of international telecommunications traffic worked out and administered 
at the European level in the European Conference of Postal, Telegraph and Telephone 
administrations (CEPT) and globally within the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). 
 
Within what came eventually to comprise the EU’s Member States, the governance of 
telecommunications was the embodiment of the traditional corporate state (Cerny 1996). 
Here, telecommunications service provision was entirely absent of market forces, a 
government owned administration being responsible for telecoms and postal services (the 
Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Administration). The justification for this sectoral 
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structure was a conjunction of utility economics and public service provision. In respect 
of the former, the telecommunications service market – consisting essentially of fixed 
line voice telephony – was deemed to be an uncontestable natural monopoly (reference) 
due in the main to the prohibitive market entry costs from investment in a 
telecommunications infrastructure. In respect of the latter, it was argued that universal 
access to a basic telecommunications service at a uniform price was effectively a social 
right for citizens to be pursued as a goal of public policy by the corporate state well 
accustomed to interventions of this kind in a number of Europe’s industrial sectors, not 
least those of the utilities (energy and telecommunications, principally). Taken together, 
it was contended that the state-owned and regulated natural monopoly PTT would be 
able, through cross-subsidisation achieved through tariff re-balancing, to undertake a 
program of network roll-out which would ensure eventually that every citizen wishing it 
would be able to access affordable and reliable telecommunications services (ref). 
 
This stable system went largely, though not completely, unchallenged across Europe for 
most of the 20th century. However, as has been thoroughly documented elsewhere  
development in telecommunications technologies, not least of which was the 
digitalisation of communications, provided the potential for new market and service 
possibilities undermining and calling into question the status quo. In particular, 
innovations which allowed computer terminals to be attached and to communicate with 
each other in conjunction with human users across telecommunications network created a 
series of new service possibilities yielding three kinds of pressure for change in the 
organisation of  telecommunication. First, economically, the market for these new Value 
Added Network Services (VANS) bore no relation to the natural monopoly traditional 
voice telephony services and were argued therefore to be inherently contestable. Second, 
commercially providing these services – essentially a combination of  IT and 
telecommunications – proved highly attractive to a series of firms outside the 
telecommunications sector. On the demand side, they also proved equally attractive to 
telecommunications customers, not least powerful multinational companies keen to 
expand internationally and aware of assistive potential of telecommunications for 
conducting their business in the most profit maximising manner, yet equally, frustrated 
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by what they viewed as the nationally constrained, costly and technically myopic series 
of services then available from PTTs. Third, telecommunications provided an important 
opportunity for political interests keen to spread the values and practices of new 
economic liberalism to the global level. The essential message promulgated here was that 
traditional corporate state sectoral intervention should give way to independently 
regulated market forces wherever possible: telecommunications, it was argued, was an 
exemplar of a situation where radical change needed to be effected nationally and 
internationally in order to reap the potential benefits in terms of economic output and 
consumer welfare gains from technological developments in the sector. 
 
As the 1980s dawned, these arguments gradually gained increasing weight across EU 
Member States, a number of which began to alter radically the structure of their 
telecommunications sectors along broadly neo-liberal lines. Foremost in the vanguard of 
change was the UK – the leading ‘regulatory state’ in Europe at the time (Bartle et al., 
2002) - which, by 1982, had created and ordered competitively new markets in VANS 
and mobile telephony, introduced duopoly competition in fixed link telecommunications, 
privatised the majority of its PTT and, lastly, relinquished regulatory responsibility for an 
increasingly competitive and complex sector to an independent regulatory authority, the 
Office of Telecommunications (Hulsink 1999). Similar, though less radical moves also 
occurred in continental Europe, notably in Germany but also France (see Thatcher 1999, 
Dyson and Humphreys 1986). As a consequence, clear signs of change appeared in the 
totemic characteristics underpinning telecommunications altering significantly 
perspectives on regulation and public interest issues. Inevitably, the more competitive 
states’ outlook on telecommunications became, the more important became the, at that 
stage, very poorly developed international market context of the sector. It is from this 
juncture and within this broad context that the influence of the EU began to emerge and 
develop at a fast pace within the European telecommunications sector. 
 
 
LIBERALISATION, RE-REGULATION AND THE EUROPEANISATION OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
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The twin structural elements of technological opportunity and neo-liberal economic 
globalisation which were utilised by ‘reformist’ governments in Europe to alter the nature 
of telecommunications provision and regulation laid the ground for the EU to consider 
the sector as one within which it could, indeed should, develop policy responsibility. This 
process, begun in the early 1980s proceeded steadily through to a first ‘equilibrium’ point 
in EU telecommunications policy around the turn of the decade (see below). As in most 
policy areas of the EU, the role of European level institutional actors – in this case the 
European Commission – proved crucial (see Schneider, Dang-Nguyen and Werle 1994). 
Noted for being an organisation constantly alive to the possibility of expanding its 
competence and authority (see Cram 1994), the European Commission quickly developed 
into a skilful political actor in telecommunications (see Sandholtz 1993, 1998) in the 
process cementing the development of telecommunications policy authority to a 
significant and what has turned out to be irreversible extent. Here, the Commission 
utilised its coercive powers, on the one hand, specifically enshrined in, and cleverly 
interpreted from, the Treaties establishing the EU (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). On 
the other, and for the most part, the Commission actively pursued securing a consensus 
on the creation of EU telecommunication policy competences through what Thatcher 
(2001) has perceived as partnership building. In this respect, the development of EU 
telecommunications policy was far from merely a story of the EU and the European 
Commission specifically driving policy forward with only limited regard for Member 
States preferences. In fact, the character of policy in telecommunications at EU level at 
any one time has tended to reflect the thinking of most Member States – or certainly the 
most influential and powerful of them – on how telecommunications should be ordered. 
 
Early telecommunications policy activity of the EU provides evidence of the European 
Commission setting out its case for reform of the sector to incorporate the EU 
institutional context. Here, one the one hand, the economic threats from what were at the 
time the EU’s two main industrial competitors  - the USA and Japan – were used to urge 
Member States to consider pooling resources of some kind at the EU level (European 
Commission 1984). On the other hand, the Commission extolled the economic  benefits 
to be derived from the creation of a Single European Market in telecommunications, part 
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of a much wider policy initiative pursued in the latter half of the 1980s (European 
Commission 1985). The theme of an EU-wide market in telecommunications services 
was at the centre of the 1987 EU Green Paper which provided the first comprehensive 
indication of the EU’s intent to develop a detailed legislative policy package of a 
liberalising kind for telecommunications. Here, the Commission declared its intention to 
propose legislation to create full EU-wide competition in telecommunications terminal 
equipment, on the one hand, and VANS on the other (European Commission 1987). The 
Green Paper also gave a strong indication of the liberal regulatory approach to the sector 
that would be pursued by the EU. For example, the paper argued that in markets subject 
to competition in the EU it was no longer tenable for the PTT administration (or the most 
recent incarnation thereof) to be both regulator and commercial player in the market in 
question. Indicative of the careful path which the Commission knew it had to tread, the 
paper nonetheless made reference to maintaining certain of the well-established elements 
of the telecommunications sector to which certain Member States – notably those of the  
EU’s Southern states - were proving reluctant to countenance changing. Here, first, the 
Commission affirmed Member States’ right to maintain voice telephonic markets as state 
owned monopolies and, second noted the continued importance of the public interest 
dimension of telecommunications pursued through universal service provision (European 
Commission 1987). 
The Commission indicated the seriousness of its liberalising intent soon afterwards 
through the publication of two directives whose purpose was to liberalise 
telecommunications terminal equipment (European Commission 1988) and VANS 
(European Commission 1989) respectively. The aftermath was a short but intense period 
of negotiation which eventually resulted in the first equilibrium point in the dynamic 
history of EU telecommunications policy. Very much aware that there were essentially 
two camps among EU Member States on telecommunications policy liberalisation – 
reformers and traditionalists – the Commission took the seemingly rather bold decision to 
pass both directives directly into EU law, thereby bypassing the Council of Ministers and 
European Parliament. This it justified by citing Article 86 (then 90) of the Treaty of 
Rome which it claimed required it to take direct remedial action in any instances where it 
found distortions of competition as a result of the granting by states of  an exclusive 
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dominant position to public undertakings in particular markets. Those of  
telecommunications terminal equipment and VANS were of this kind, the Commission 
argued.   
 
The Commission’s action precipitated two legal challenges in the European Court of 
Justice around each proposed directive from states opposed to both the substance of the 
directives and the manner in which the Commission proposed to enact them. However, 
there were at the same time powerful EU Member States, not least among which 
Germany and the UK, which supported the directives content, though being opposed to 
the Commission’s methods. It was also the case that as the 1980s ended, countries such 
as France began to become more attuned to the view that commercial opportunities from 
liberalising the newer parts of the telecommunications sector might outweigh the threats 
from so doing. Aware in classic neo-mercantilistic fashion of its leading position at the 
time in VANS delivered through the ambitious state-funded Teletel programme, France 
was keen to capture any opportunities which might be gained from exporting its 
technologies and services internationally. The EU could even act as something of a tool 
of justifying liberalisation to particularly resistant domestic interests (Thatcher 2002b).  
 
As a consequence, a situation which had initially all the hallmarks of  controversy and 
stalemate proved ripe for compromise, something which the Commission took pains to 
secure by 1990. The ‘settlement package’ involved the passage of the two directives, the 
one on services (European Commission 1990) having been modified to allow Member 
States to impose certain public service obligations on private telecommunications 
operators leasing lines on the public network (Woolcock et al., 1991). The second 
element was the passage of a framework directive on Open Network Provision in 
telecommunications (European Parliament and Council 1990) which concerned creating 
harmonised conditions to allow free competition to be practised across 
telecommunications networks. The ‘ONP compromise’ as it came to be known provided 
an important balance between the liberalising power of  the article 86 directives (the legal 
challenges to which were rejected by the European Court of  Justice) and the harmonising 
tenor of the ONP framework directive. The latter would prove in the next phase of EU 
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telecommunications policy an important focal point for reaching the next equilibrium 
point in the move towards further liberalisation of telecommunications across the EU 
since it was able to facilitate competition promoting and public interest defending 
measures simultaneously (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). 
 
The next significant period of development of EU telecommunications policy involved a 
much less controversial series of negotiations between Member States in which the 
European Commission continued to be the key EU level institutional actor. In 1992, it 
undertook the Telecommunications Services Review which involved in part the 
canvassing of opinion from interested parties from the public and private sectors across 
Europe on how, if at all, telecommunications policy should be developed. In this way, the 
Commission applied its by now well-established tactic of aiming to push the agenda of 
liberalisation forward, yet at the same time proceeding as consensually as possible. The 
Review resulted in the presentation to EU Member States of four possible options which 
ranged from the least radical of stalling the liberalisation process through to the 
liberalisation of all voice telephonic communications services across the EU. The extent 
to which the liberalisation ‘bandwagon’ was gaining speed across the EU was clear in the 
1993 agreement by Member States to proceed with the most radical proposal - itself 
favoured by the Commission – to be achieved by 1998 by the majority of EU Member 
States (European Council of Ministers 1993). This was soon followed by a further 
agreement – stimulated by the conclusions of an analysis of Europe’s position in the 
emerging so-called Information Society by the Bangemann Group (European 
Commission 1994a) – to liberalise all telecommunications infrastructures across the EU 
by 1998, in complement to the earlier voice telephonic services liberalisation agreement 
(European Council of Ministers 1994). 
Nonetheless, despite the period lacking the intensity leading up to the previous stage of 
equilibrium in the development of EU telecommunications policy, there were a number 
of issues which required resolution before agreement could be reached on this quantum 
leap forward on liberalisation and, thereafter, the necessary legislation be put in place to 
realise the 1998 liberalisation deadline. Most significantly, several EU Member States, 
with less well-developed infrastructures were able to negotiate derogations to allow them 
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until 2000 (in the case of Luxembourg) and 2003 (in the cases of  Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) to open their voice telephonic markets and telecommunications 
infrastructures to full competition. Others, notably France and fellow Southern states, 
were able to ensure that the package of legislative measures enacted up to the 1998 
deadline in order to lay out the basic parameters of the liberalised telecommunications 
market also contained measures to protect the provision of public interest in 
telecommunications through universal service provision (European Parliament and 
Council 1997 and 1998). It has also been argued by Thatcher (2001) that the European 
Commission took care to ensure that liberalising legislation necessary to create the 
potential for competition in so-called alternative infrastructures – satellite, cable and 
mobile – kept pace with the domestic reform agendas of Member States in these areas.  
 
Overall, that EU telecommunications policy developed to such a significant extent to 
reach this second equilibrium point is indicative of nothing short of an attitudinal 
transformation among Member States regarding the place of telecommunications in the 
global economy and the opportunities to be derived as a consequence. Even those with 
arguably least to gain from exposing their domestic markets to liberalisation became 
convinced enough of the likely practical benefits of liberalisation in terms of  lower 
prices and better quality services for consumers to agree to the wholesale changes. The 
transformation was at times skilfully exploited by the increasingly sure-footed European 
Commission. For example, it became involved in a negotiation to secure liberalisation of 
alternative infrastructures in France and Germany two years ahead of schedule in return 
for regulatory approval of a proposed telecommunications services international joint 
venture between their increasingly commercially oriented former incumbents France 
Telecom and Deutsche Telekom (Bartle 2001). Nevertheless, it also became clear at the 
time that though a considerable transference of legislative sovereignty in 
telecommunications was occurring to the European level in the service of European-wide 
competition, day-to-day responsibility for the regulation of telecommunications would be 
very much the responsibility of the national level thereby effectively remaining 
overwhelmingly under its control. 
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REFINMENT OF EU TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY – THE CREATION OF 
THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
Agreement on the 1998 regulatory framework for telecommunications meant that within 
the space of a decade a battery of legislation of both a competition-creating (liberalising) 
and harmonising kind had been created at the EU level, over which the latter held shared 
responsibility with Member States for implementing. Across the EU, a remarkable 
transition from the traditional telecommunications regime based on state-owned natural 
monopoly to one of across-the-board neo-liberal market competition had occurred. Here 
national governments relinquished their role as corporate states in telecommunications, 
replacing it instead with regulatory state (Seidman and Gilmour 1986) governance in 
which the key decisions about the functioning of  the telecommunications sector were 
taken by a new series of publicly funded though operationally independent National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) (see Thatcher 2002a, 2002b). At the EU level too, there is 
strong evidence in telecommunications policy of efforts to create a European regulatory 
state (Majone 1994, 1996, 1997) in which the European Commission working alongside 
regulatory committees composed of national representatives often from the NRA made 
technical decisions on the possible regulatory evolution of the sector on an EU-wide 
basis. Outstanding here in the 1998 Framework was the ONP Committee. 
 
Nonetheless, the second key stage of EU telecommunications policy equilibrium which 
the 1998 Framework represented was only in effect the point at which the fundamental 
basic structure of the European regulatory state in telecommunications was mapped out. 
Setting out the parameters of such a system was one thing; ensuring its effective 
implementation was another. So rather like the previous phases of EU 
telecommunications policy highlighted in the chapter thus far, the European Commission 
almost immediately set about examining how the framework might more effectively 
embed a comprehensive efficiently-functioning liberalised market system. The by now 
well utilised tool of a comprehensive sectoral review and consultation (European 
Commission 1999) in anticipation of further policy actions marked the commencement of 
the next developmental phase in EU telecommunications policy launched in 1999. The 
review itself undertook three main lines of enquiry: the functional efficacy or otherwise 
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of the 1998 framework; the possibility of making existing regulation in key parts of the 
telecommunications sector less burdensome and complex in response to evidence of the 
emergence of a competitive market; and the possibility of creating some kind of 
convergent regulatory framework for all communications networks and services. The 
latter issue stemmed from yet another policy review on the matter undertaken by the 
European Commission in 1997 (European Commission 1997) which proved highly 
controversial (see Levy 1997, 1999). In brief, Member States decided that it would not be 
possible to create a convergent regulatory framework for all communications 
infrastructures and services since the latter would have to cover the highly sensitive area 
of broadcasting which it soon emerged Member States were unwilling to treat as part of 
any convergent framework, let alone an EU level one (see Simpson 2000). However, it 
was considered appropriate to develop a convergent regulatory framework where possible 
to cover all communications infrastructures including those of broadcasting and the 
Internet. The outcome of the 1999 Communications Review was largely a re-statement of 
this position and was much more interesting in terms of decisions taken regarding the 
first two of its core lines of enquiry. 
 
The first main proposal to emerge from the Review was to create radical rationalisation in 
what was perceived to be an over-elaborate regulatory framework for 
telecommunications. The new system – the Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework (ECRF) – would see a reduction in the number of directives making up the 
previous system from 20 to six in the process reducing the workloads of  NRAs and 
making the system simpler and more cost effective to comply with for 
telecommunications companies operating in the Single Market. As the name suggests, the 
ECRF was convergent in scope, covering broadcast and Internet infrastructures alongside 
those of telecommunications. It was to consist of two measures of a liberalising purpose – 
a general competition directive (European Commission 2002) and a regulation passed 
with some urgency on 2000 which mandated Member States to take action to ensure 
unbundling of the local loop (European Parliament and Council 2000), or last mile, of the 
telecommunications network in their jurisdictions, seen at the time to be a major 
impediment to the growth of competition. It would also be made up of five harmonising 
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directives dealing respectively with general framework issues (European Parliament and 
Council 2002a), data protection and privacy (European Parliament and Council 2002e), 
universal service (European Parliament and Council 2002d), authorisation (European 
Parliament and Council 2002c) and access and interconnection (European Parliament and 
Council 2002b). 
 
Whilst the above rationalisation element of the ECRF and its implied refinement of the 
recently established European regulatory state in telecommunications proved relatively 
uncontroversial, the movement towards the next equilibrium point in the history of EU 
telecommunications policy also involved significant disagreements requiring typical 
European compromises. A key indicator of the efficacy of the market liberalisation 
project in telecommunications would be the extent to, and the speed at, which ex ante 
sector specific regulation for designated markets within the telecommunications sector 
could be removed allowing them merely to be governed by general EU competition law, 
one of the areas in which the EU, and the European Commission in particular, has 
developed most authority.  
 
The debate centred specifically on the designated threshold figure for determining the 
existence of Significant Market Power (SMP), thus calling forth ex ante regulatory 
measures. In the 1998 regulatory framework, any operator holding a 25% or greater share 
of a particular market was subject to specific regulatory measures requiring it to offer 
interconnection arrangements to its network to competitors according to a cost based 
formula. In the negotiations, the European Commission proposed the quite radical step of 
raising this threshold SMP figure to 50% - operators with a market share below this 
would be free to negotiate arrangements for the provision of interconnection to their 
competitors privately. This would have reduced the regulatory burden on itself and NRAs 
and could also be seen politically as a measure which affirmed the efficacy of  an albeit 
relatively new competitive market environment in telecommunications. The implication 
here was that market forces were strong enough to counteract anti-competitive tendencies 
even in situations where one player held as much as 40% of a particular market.  
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For a number of Member States - not least the telecommunications neo-liberal 
forerunner, the UK - this proved to be a leap of faith too far. Unsurprisingly, new entrant 
companies were also concerned that the potential looseness of the regulatory framework 
regarding SMP would deprive them of the protection necessary to ensure that they held 
on to their current position in key markets, let alone to develop it further. In the end, a 
compromise solution was reached: the SMP threshold proposed by the Commission was 
raised to 50%. However, alongside this the EU issued a detailed list of criteria, other than 
market share, to be used in an assessment of whether market dominance existed in any 
particular case, taking into account key issues voiced in the debate such as collective  and 
leveraged dominance (Humphreys and Simpson 2007, forthcoming). 
 
The negotiations on the ECRF also illustrated, once more, the extent to which the 
European Commission had become a key politico-institutional player in the regulation of 
the European telecommunications sector. As part of its proposals for the ECRF, the 
Commission argued that it should be given a right of veto over certain decisions made by 
NRAs. Specifically, it argued that it should be granted the authority to prevent Member 
States from making additions to the list of markets which the latter would draw up as 
being subject to sector-specific ex-ante regulation. The Commission also proposed that it 
should have the right to examine and if necessary veto NRA decisions on the withdrawal 
of ex ante regulation from any telecommunications market, necessitating either an 
amendment or complete withdrawal of the initial decision. Backed by the support of both 
established and newer telecommunications operators, the Commission secured the 
significant increase in its power to obtain a veto right in respect of the decisions on 
whether operators held SMP and the classification of new telecommunications markets as 
needing sector –specific ex ante regulation. The Commission was not able, however, to 
secure its desired veto over regulatory remedies proposed by NRAs in any particular 
instance, an issue which merely was placed on the Commission’s policy ‘backburner’ as 




Another important issue requiring a compromise solution concerned the Commission’s 
role in EU level regulatory committees for telecommunications. This matter gives a 
strong flavour of how far EU telecommunications policy had developed since its 
inception in the mid-1980s: the parameters of the European regulatory state having been 
established in the domain the detailed mechanics of the functioning regulatory state at the 
national and EU levels needed to be secured and augmented as necessary. In this regard, 
the 1999 Communications Review contained a proposal from the Commission to create a 
High Level Communications Group under its auspices made up of the EU NRAs. This 
was interpreted by Member States as an attempt by the European Commission to 
manoeuvre itself into a position something akin to a European telecommunications 
regulator (Michalis 2004), something which had been vaunted in the past but strongly 
resisted by both governmental (see  Bartle 2001) and commercial interests in 
telecommunications at the national level. The compromise position eventually reached 
saw the establishment of the European Regulators Group (ERG) which had a similar 
composition to the proposed HLCG but with much less power being transferred to the EU 
level, the Commission securing for itself the chair of the Group for which it also provided 
administrative support. Nonetheless, this role was enough to give the Commission a 
better developed opportunity to monitor, and even possibly steer, the unfolding of the 
single European Market in telecommunications than was at its disposal heretofore. 
 
The extent of the development of EU telecommunications policy can be appreciated 
through a brief consideration of the kinds of activities which are required to take place at 
the EU level to ensure the smooth functioning and continued development of the single 
EU-wide market. It is important to note that whilst the EU has assumed considerable 
authority in the telecommunications sphere, it has by no means displaced the national 
level which still maintains the lion’s share of responsibility for the day to day functioning 
of markets. This dispersal of responsibility across the EU policy landscape in a 
qualitatively different fashion than in the past has created a pan-European network of 
governance which has been associated with the growth of the regulatory state (Majone 
2000). Within this network which is essentially two level - that is EU and national - in 
nature a broad series quasi state actors tend to predominate. Crucial among these are the 
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European Commission and NRAs which take part in various technocratically organised 
committees and working groups at the EU level (Humphreys and Simpson 2007, 
forthcoming). The gravitation towards agreement on the ECRF both cemented and 
developed further this arrangement. As a consequence, there was a growth in EU level 
regulatory committee governance in telecommunications: a Communications Committee, 
a Radio Spectrum Committee, a Radio Spectrum Advisory Group and an advisory 
working party to deal with data protection issues were created (Humphreys and Simpson 
2005). The Commission formed a task force of members from its Information Society 
and Media and Competition Directorates-General to deal with pressing issues such as 
SMP and market definition, illustrating again its influence in orchestrating the mechanics 
of competition in the new liberalising market scenario.  
 
The more elaborate the regime of competition became in EU telecommunications policy 
the greater was the requirement for regulation to ensure that competition was nurtured 
and maintained. This has placed a highly significant regulatory onus on the new quasi-
state functionaries of telecommunications governance in the EU. Whilst the era of the 
corporate state in telecommunications has well and truly disappeared, intervention in the 
market has arguably increased, the desire of the Commission and others to remove ex-
ante regulation notwithstanding. Here, for example, the Commission has since before the 
agreement of the 1998 framework conducted market reviews of the state of competition 
across the EU. It has also issued numerous proceedings against Member States for non-
compliance with EU legislation of various kinds from transposition to implementation. In 
general, the regulatory workload of the network of EU and national level regulatory 
players – from the drafting, transposition, implementation, monitoring and review of an 
increasingly complex system – is substantial. Telecommunications provides one of the 
most mature examples of the consequences of choosing to replace the domestically 
focused corporate state with a European-oriented regulatory version. 
 
MOVING TOWARDS THE NEXT POLICY EQUILIBRIUM IN EU 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE 2006 COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW 
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The agreement on, and operationalisation of, the ECRF from 2002 onwards has not 
marked the end of the evolution of the EU telecommunications to a ‘steady state’ 
equilibrium. In fact, one of the paradoxes of early 21st century neo-liberalism is the need 
for close management and ongoing refinement of the market mechanism (for the core of 
this idea see Vogel 1996). The result at this point appears far from the light-touch or 
‘nightwatchman’ (Gill and Law) role for the public sector envisioned by advocates of a 
neo-liberal governance order, albeit that the state is now clearly at one remove from the 
‘mechanics’ of the telecommunications sector. For EU telecommunication policy this has 
been manifest in the 2006 review of the ECRF which at the time of writing is still 
ongoing.  
 
Many of the by now well recognised characteristics of the politics of EU 
telecommunications are evident in its current phase which is likely to lead to the EU and 
its Member States gravitating towards another equilibrium policy position in 
telecommunications which further cements the regulatory state in the sector at national 
and European levels, though any new framework is unlikely to be in place before 2009. 
The review was launched by a consultation period based on discussion documents 
produced by the European Commission which drew in part on the findings of a number 
of consultancy studies of the telecommunications sector which it commissioned. In its 
proposals, there is yet more evidence of the Commission wishing to consolidate further 
its position of influence in EU telecommunications, something which is likely to cause 
resolution through the kind of policy compromises which have characterised EU 
telecommunications policy since the late 1980s.  
In its recommendations, the Commission focused on four key areas, three of which relate 
specifically to ongoing refinement of the Single Market in telecommunications, the fourth 
introducing proposals for the creation of a competitive environment for spectrum 
management, an important consequence of the development of digitalisation and the 
growth of mobile communications. The former three issues relate to: first, further 
reduction in the level of ex-ante regulation applying to the telecommunications sector 
through its removal in six of the 18 markets defined by the Commission (European 
Commission 2003a); second, making the market review procedure faster and less 
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burdensome; and, third, measures to ensure that regulatory remedies for problems 
identified in the markets of telecommunications are consistent and applied in the same 
manner across EU Member States (European Commission 2006a). 
 
Regarding the streamlining of market reviews, the Commission noted the widespread 
view among NRAs that the undertaking of market analyses and notifications of 
regulatory action  - classic burdens of the regulatory state in action – were proving 
onerous to the point of being counterproductive. As a consequence, the Commission 
proposed the introduction of a simplified procedure for those telecommunications 
markets which were previously found to operate subject to a satisfactory level of 
competition and for those notifications, such as proposed remedies, which were only of a 
minor nature (European Commission 2006b).  The Commission also proposed a 
rationalisation and clarification of market review procedures. It noted how under the 
current ECRF these are spread between the Framework Directive and the 2003 
Commission Recommendation on markets and put forward the consolidation of 
arrangements into a single legislative instrument in the form of a Regulation.  
 
Though not specifically mentioned by the Commission, use of a Regulation would negate 
the need for transposition of the measure into national law, once passed it being directly 
applicable to Member States. The Commission argued here that the Regulation ‘could set 
a precise and legally binding timetable, using defined triggers, for initiating and for 
completing future market analyses and for the imposition or removal of remedies’ 
(European Commission 2006: 16). The Commission noted a current inefficiency in the 
system where NRAs have in certain instances split notification between the three key 
issues of market definition, SMP analysis and proposed remedies causing delays in the 
system. The Regulation would bind legally NRAs to undertake all three as part of a single 
process. The Commission was critical of a lack of response form NRAs to the former’s 
veto decisions on market reviews granted to the Commission as a result of the ECRF 
negotiations (see above). It proposed that the Regulation should tighten up the 
requirements on NRAs to do this, by mandating legally a response within a specified 
period of time. All of this does not suggest that the work of NRAs will be any less 
 19 
pressurised and would seem to point to a strengthening of the EU’s regulatory grip 
(through the proposed Regulation) on the evolution of competition in the 
telecommunications market at the national level. 
 
The most likely controversial area of  the current communications review concerns the 
Commission’s proposal to extend its right of veto, itself secured controversially, as laid 
out in Article 7 of the 2002 Framework Directive. Commenting upon the functioning of 
the ECRF to date the Commission noted, referring to one of the key elements of the 
article 7 procedure that ‘consistency has been improved in the way that markets are 
defined and SMP is assessed, but only to a lesser extent in relation to the choice of 
appropriate remedies’ (European Commission 2006b: 18) noting cases of inadequate and 
ineffective remedial action having been taken by certain NRAs. It also noted specifically 
that there were cases of different remedies having been applied to similar problems in 
different Member States and also cases of differential implementation nationally of  the 
same remedies.  
 
As a consequence, the Commission put forward the rather bold proposal that its right of 
veto be extended to remedies. Sensitive to the potential controversial nature of this 
proposal and previous baulking by Member States at the idea of transferring too much 
power into the Commission’s regulatory hands, it aimed to allay any such fears in this 
instance by arguing that  it ‘would not have the power to replace an NRA remedy by one 
of its own but would indicate the problems with the remedy proposed by the NRA in its 
justification for the veto decision’ (European Commission, 2006: 18). By implication, the 
NRA would have to then produce a remedy to the Commission’s satisfaction, arguably 
increasing the regulatory burden its faces even further and emphasising the growing 
regulatory power of the Commission. The extent to which this proposal will be viewed, 
on the one hand as a sensible piece of pragmatism, or on the other, as a move to create 
the Commission as a European telecommunications regulator ‘by the back door’ may 
determine whether or not the proposal is accepted in its current form, rejected out of hand 
or, perhaps most likely given past precedent, modified into a suitable compromise.  
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The Commission also moved to close what it perceived to be the growing practice across 
the EU of utilising the legal system, through appeals against NRA decisions, to delay the 
operationalisation of remedial action to rid abuses of competition in the single 
telecommunications market. Specifically, it proposed the amendment of Article 4 of the 
Framework directive so that national courts could only suspend NRA decisions in the 
face of appeal where there was demonstrable ‘irreparable harm to the appellant’ 
(European Commission 2006b: 19) as well as an EU wide procedure to monitor the 
incidence of suspensions. The Commission’s proposals also made reference to two other 
key areas where it noted inconsistency of approach across EU Member States. First, 
regarding what should have been in theory a light touch system of general authorisations 
to provide a service (as opposed to the more onerous system of licences which pre-dated 
it)  it was apparent that ‘most often individual rights of use are required at national level 
for using scarce resources’ (European Commission 2006b: 19) which tended to differ 
across Member States. As a result, the Commission proposed to introduce three measures 
at EU level: first, a system for determining that services had a pan-European scope in 
order to apply, second, a commonly defined system of authorisation and selection; third a 
series of commonly applied conditions for rights to use scarce communications resources. 
Decisions relating to these matters would be taken at EU committee level, an increasingly 
important aspect of telecommunications policy making.  The Commission also addressed 
what it perceived as a problem of inconsistent use of Article 5 of the 2002 Access 
directive which permits NRAs to take action against companies without SMP to improve 
access, interconnection and end-to-end connectivity. The proposed solution would 
involve devolving more power to the EU level in that NRAs would be required to submit 
their intentions in this regard to the Commission which, using the aforementioned 
regulatory committee decision procedure, would adjudicate on the proposal. 
 
Finally, the ‘totemic’ change in European telecommunications which witnessed the 
replacement of state ownership and public service provision with liberalisation delivered 
through market regulation over almost 25 years has significantly altered the position of 
the telecommunications user. The emergence and development of the neo-liberal project 
in telecommunications inevitably resulted in a focus on users as customers as opposed to 
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citizens to an unprecedented degree though it must also be stated that universal service 
was ensconced as a key element of the 1998 regulatory framework and has remained so 
ever since. Through the original ONP Framework directive, those Member States of the 
EU, notably France, with very strong traditions of service public in telecommunications 
which they wished to see maintained and protected, were able to upload their preferences 
here to ensure that a harmonised system of universal service was established legally at 
EU level. The current review of telecommunications gives an indication of the state of 
the European Commission’s thinking on universal service and its place within the 
maturing European regulatory state in telecommunications.  
 
In 2005 the EU undertook a review of universal service involving a consultation exercise 
whose results suggested that Member States did not wish to alter radically in the short to 
medium term the current stipulations for universal service. As a consequence, current 
Commission proposals for developing universal service are modest in nature. In response 
to the emergence of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, the Commission’s wish 
is to separate universal service obligations placed on infrastructure providers, on the one 
hand and service providers, on the other, the assumption being that the growth of VoIP 
will greatly increase user choice of voice service providers. The extent to which the 
market will provide the staples of universal service in the future is also clear from the 
proposal to remove the provision of directory enquiry services from the universal service 
package and leave its provision instead to the market (European Commission 2006b). 
The Commission’s approach to universal service in the near and longer term future is 
underpinned by the rather optimistic view that where necessary the system ‘could be 
adjusted to anticipate changes in markets and technologies…[to] allow for regulatory 
obligations to be reduced once the market is shown to be meeting users’ needs’ 
(European Commission 2006b: 34). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Telecommunications is arguably the most EU-ised of the culture industries examined in 
this volume. As shown in the chapter, this has evolved as a complex process involving 
key institutional and private actors at the national and European level for the best part of 
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a quarter of a century. Underpinning the development of EU telecommunications policy 
has been the replacement of the traditional core ‘totemic’ values of state ownership and 
public interest provision by the new practices of economic liberalisation and market 
regulation and their associated values. As noted in the chapter, the internationalisation of 
the governance of the sector to the EU level which has accompanied this fundamental 
change has proceeded as a steady movement along the scale of liberalisation, reached 
through the attainment of a series of compromise temporary policy equilibrium points. It 
is important to point out that, though it has proceeded apace, the maturation of  a 
liberalised telecommunications market through a comprehensive regulatory framework 
has not yet been completed fully. In fact, the chapter has shown that the creation of the 
regulatory state in telecommunications (replacing the historic corporate state) was only 
the beginning – the evolving experiment of the regulatory state in action in 
telecommunications is still unfolding as illustrated by current ongoing negotiations 
among EU Member States and the European Commission to modify further the ECRF. 
 
How significant, then, has the EU been in this increasingly important part of the 
information and communications domain? There is little doubt that a re-ordered 
governance of the sector along the lines of the neo-liberal model in Europe’s political 
territories would have occurred without the existence of the EU: the powerful 
opportunities as well as threats associated with economic globalisation (see Weiss 1998, 
2003), would have ensured this. However, the EU has provided a vital means for its 
Member States of negotiating the complexities of globalisation (see Wallace 2000), in 
this case the internationalisation of the telecommunications sector. It has allowed them to 
upload their policy preferences at key junctures - and has provided a relatively familiar 
and secure environment within which to mark out and refine a single telecommunications 
market space in Europe, something recognised more widely as a classic set of policy 
responses to Europeanisation (see Borzel 2002). The EU has been utilised to play an 
important role in synchronising the liberalisation of telecommunications to the different 
speeds of reform found across the EU. As in all situations of EU-isation, compromise 
outcomes have characterised the various equilibrium points reached in the development 
of EU telecommunications policy and it would also be realistic to assert that the point of 
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policy lock-in in telecommunications for Member States has been reached some time 
ago, probably by 1994, with agreements by then made to liberalise comprehensively all 
telecommunications infrastructures and services.  
 
However, the development of EU telecommunications policy has not been driven 
completely by the intergovernmental exchanges and compromises of the EU’s member 
countries. Any decision to use the EU institutional context to the extent exhibited by 
Member States in telecommunications bears a ‘cost’ in terms of the ceding partially of 
governance authority. This is has been most clearly illustrated by the prominent role 
played in an administrative and political capacity by the European Commission which 
has developed into one of the most skilful political actors on the European 
telecommunications policy landscape. It is also evident in the growth of a clutch of 
regulatory committees at EU level to deal with the many complex matters that arise from 
the decision to create competition across Europe in a former utility sector. The resulting 
pattern is a complex  regulatory web (Radaelli 2004) of  transnational network (Eberlein 
and Grande 2005) governance in which a plethora of  public and private actors play a part 
in the evolution of the sector. Here NRAs working domestically and at the EU level 
interact with the European Commission as the core regulatory relationship in the sector. 
This has required the creation of an accommodative relationship between regulatory 
peers from different markets with different degrees of maturity as well as with the 
European Commission with its specifically European overview agenda. The robustness 
and continual development of telecommunications policy is testament to the realisation 
by Member States of the importance of the EU context as well as the various roles – 
policy entrepreneur, facilitator, monitor and administrator - astutely played by EU 
institutional actors - most significantly the Commission - across its history. These key 
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